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Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?:t Why and
How UNHCR Governance of "Development"
Refugee Camps Should be Subject to
International Human Rights Law
by Ralph Wilde*
[I]t has become increasingly clear that the principle of
responsibility must now be used in a more inclusive manner,
applied not only to states but also to all of those other actors which
play a significant part in national and international affairs: rebel
groups, political leaders and parties, warlords and military
factions, religious bodies and commercial enterprises, to give just a
few examples
What about the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees?
I. INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT CAMPS
I1 In the developing world, many refugees are located in medium-
term development camps. These camps are invariably under the de facto
control of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
since host states lack the resources to act in a manner that would bring
"'Who is to keep guard over the guards themselves." JuvENAL, THE SDXrEEN SATIRES (Peter
Green trans., Penguin Press 1974).
. Visiting Scholar, Yale Law School. The views in this note remain solely those of the author
and should not be construed as representing UNHCR policy. The author would like to
express his gratitude to James Hathaway and Jane Alexander for their kind help and
encouragement. A shorter version of this thesis was delivered in comments at Applying
International Law to Contemporary Phenomena, an International Law Student Association (ILSA)
panel chaired by the author at the American Society of International Law Annual Conference
on April 3,1998. The uncited descriptions of the camps throughout this Note stem from the
author's experiences working in them.
1. UNrrED NATIONs HIGH CoMMIssIoNTER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES 1997-98: A HUMANrARiAN AGENDA 274 (1997) (visited Apr. 16,1998)
<http:f//www.unhcr.ch/sowr97/> [hereinafter UNHCR, HuMANTARIAN AGENDA].
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their international legal responsibilities into meaningful effect. Through the
example of Dadaab camps of Kenya,2 this piece argues that when UNHCR
governs such camps, it should adopt a modus operandi based on
international human rights law. Such an approach is possible because
UNHCR has the necessary personality in international law to engage with
the human rights law that applies to the refugees in the camps.
[2 This piece concerns the application of international law to
"development camps." The term refers to UNHCR-run refugee camps
which are located in the developing world, and also have UNHCR status of
being in a "development situation." "Development situation" status
denotes settled and complex communities of refugees who have no
immediate prospect of being assimilated, resettled, or repatriated. In
contrast, "emergency situation" status involves camps as short-term havens
in response to a crisis. Emergency situation status often evolves into
development status. Development camps are sophisticated polities, with
marketplaces, schools, hospitals, mosques, churches, running water, and
decision-making fora. Demographics within them are not necessarily
homogenous, and often coexisting refugee communities manifest profound
differences in country of origin, culture, religion, and education.
R3 The Dadaab camps of Kenya (Dagahaley, Hagadera and Ifo) are
typical development camps. They are located in the northeast of Kenya,
equidistant to the town of Garrissa and the Liboi border-crossing with
Somalia.3 After the complete breakdown of order in areas of Somalia,4
refugees fearful for their lives fled to neighboring Kenya and were located
in temporary camps organized by UNHCR. As the situation in Somalia
remained such that many refugees could not return, and more were
arriving, these camps turned into development camps. The general refugee
population in Kenya was consolidated, and refugees from the Sudan,
Ethiopia, Uganda, and other countries joined the Somalis in Dadaab.
UNI-CR runs the camps, and is directly responsible for protection issues,
including the processing of new arrivals and applications for resettlement
and repatriation! Most day-to-day operations are delegated to NGO
Implementing Partners (IPs), which run various strategies in the camps to
actively promote development, impacting the environmental, economic,
and social fields.6 Environmental initiatives by Gesellschaft fdr Technische
Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) train refugees in conservation skills, not only to
2. The empirical research for this Article was conducted during a women's rights
promotion and monitoring project devised and implemented by the author for UNHCR as
part of the Camp Sadako program in the Dadaab camps of Kenya. The project report is
contained in RALPH WILDE, PARLIAMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, BEYOND THE YOKE: THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN REFUGEES IN THE DADAAB CAMPS OF KENYA (1997). Part of this
research consists of questionnaire responses, copies of which are contained in Dadaab
Questionnaire Responses (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Human Rights and
Development Law Journal).
3. See Wilde, supra note 2, at 4.
4. For background on Somalia, see Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi, The Refugee Crisis in Africa
as a Crisis of the Institution of the State, 6 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 562,570-72 (1994).




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 1 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol1/iss1/5
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
preserve the environment in the camps, but also to develop expertise that
will go with the refugees wherever they end up. 7 CARE operates a
children's educational curriculum; the Canadian Baptists run skills training
in income-generating tailoring activities for adults." Medical services
provided by Md~cins sans Fronti~res (Doctors without Borders), Belgium
not only meet the immediate needs of refugees, but also provide a degree
of long-term care in immunization and planned parenthood programs. In
many ways, the camps constitute a more developed society than the local
area, a desert populated by nomads and plagued with bandits.
HI. THE CRISIS IN REFUGEE PROTECTION AND ITS EFFECT ON GOVERNANCE
A. The Crisis
[4 The international protection of refugees is in crisis because the
applicable legal regime no longer meets the interests of those to whom it
applies, yet the political will among states for reform is lacking. Refugee
law accords full responsibility to whichever state refugees flee to,9
irrespective of both the state's ability to offer them any meaningful
protection, and the development and security implications of having to
attempt this. As most refugee movements occur in the developing world,
and developed states. increasingly adopt non-entree measures, the legal
burden of protecting the vast majority of the world's refugees is shouldered
by developing countries who do not have the wherewithal to fulfill this
legal obligation.' As a result, these refugees invariably live in conditions
7. These initiatives were precipitated by concerns raised by Kenya about the impact of the
camps on their local environment They include promoting more efficient use of fuel through
different cooking methods and the use of wood-saving and solar stoves, tree-planting, and
water recycling.
8. These were long-term courses in tailoring for women, who sell their work during the
course to raise enough money to buy a sewing machine at the end. Upon completing the
course, women are in a position to generate income independently, through selling their work
in the markets.
9. For example, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,18
U.N.T.S. 137 (visited Apr. 16,1998)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/asvlum/195eng.htm> (ratified by
Kenya on May 16,1966) [hereinafter 1951 Convention], does not contain provisions that allow
for burden-sharing in refugee protection, other than a hortatory reference to the need for
"international co-operation" in the preamble. See id. at pbml.
10. In explaining the unwillingness of many nations to ratify the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) Convention, infra note 13, Paul Kuruk cites "governments' reluctance to
contractually bind themselves in ways which, given their poor economic status, will be
difficult to satisfy or will require better conditions than those available to nationals." Paul
Kuruk, Refugeeism, A Dilemma in International Human Rights: Problems in the Legal Protection of
Refigees in West Africa, 1 TEMPLE INr'L & COMP. L.J. 179, 221 (1987). J. Garvey argues that
"refugee flow imposes severe social and economic burdens on receiving states .... Potential
receiving states see themselves being asked for one-sided sacrifices .... Jack I. Garvey, The
New Asylum Seekers: Addressing Their Origin, in THE NEW ASYLUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW L\T
THE 1980S 181,188 (David.A. Martin ed., 1988). This is indeed why the OAU Convention
deliberately leaves out the whole range of rights provided for in the 1951 Convention. For an
1998]
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of insecurity and deprivation, reliant on whatever protection and
assistance is provided by agencies like UNHCR."
5 The motifs of the crisis can be seen in the Dadaab camps. From the
beginning the influx of refugees was processed by UNHCR, not Kenya.
Kenya was willing only to countenance the refugees' continued presence
provided that UNHCR accepted full practical responsibility. Even this
acquiescence has been threatened, both by security problems as bandits
cross the Somali border to attack refugees, and by tensions with Kenyans in
the local area, many of whom are ethnically Somali and receive less
support than the refugees. 2 It is clear, therefore, that without the support
of the international community in the form of UNHCR, countries legally
responsible for protecting refugees in development camps would have no
means of trying to meet this responsibility.
B. UNHCR as defacto Sovereign?
6 The consequence of this crisis is that development camps are
invariably located in states, but under the control of UNHCR. Kenya has
ratified the OAU Convention, 3 the 1951 Convention, 14 and the 1967
Protocol.u5 These instruments acknowledge the rights and duties of the
refugees and the host state in international law. They set out a legal
framework that delineates the relationship between the two, with
example of the kinds of demands being made upon host states, see Conclusions and
Recommendations, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REFUGEES: HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE No BORDERS.
(1997) (visited Apr. 16,1998)
<http:/ /wwvv.amnesty.org/ailib/intcam/refugee/recomend.htm>. See also COLES, PROBLEMS
ARISING FROM LARGE NUMBERS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: A STUDY OF PROTECTION ASPECTS 8-11
(1981) (making recommendations to governments of countries of asylum) [hereinafter COLES,
PROBLEMS]. Numerous perspectives on the issue also may be found in OAU/UNHCR
Commemorative Symposium on Refugees and the Problems of Forced Population Displacements in
Africa, INrr'L J. REFUGEE L., Summer 1995 [hereinafter OAU/UNHCR Symposium].
Furthermore, some suggested that the increasing democratization of Africa will precipitate
greater resistance to asylum seekers on the part of receiving states on the continent. "Growing
democratization and press freedom.., in Africa are leading to increasing pressure from
domestic public opinion." Sadako Ogata, Peace, Security and Humanitarian Action, Alistair
Buchanan Memorial Lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (April 3,1997)
(visited Apr. 16,1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/3ap1997.htm>
[hereinafter Ogata, Peace]. Kenya itself has itself refouled asylum-seekers. "In July, over 900
Somali refugees were forcibly returned to Somalia by the Kenyan army six days after seeking
asylum in Kenya." Kenya, in AlvESN' INrrERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1997
(visited Apr. 16,1998) <http://www.amnestv.org/ailib/aireport/ar97/AFR32.htm>.
11. See generally AmqES' L\rrERNATIONAL, REFUGEES: HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE No BORDERS,
supra note 10 (describing the effects of this crisis on refugees); UNHCR, HUMANITARIAN
AGENDA, supra note 1 (same). For the particular situation in Africa, see generally Abdullahi,
supra note 4(discussing the situation); OAU/UNHCR Symposium, supra note 10(same).
12. See Wilde, supra note 2, at 13-16 (describing the insecurity in the camps).
13. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10,
1969,14 U.N.T.S. 691 (visited Apr. 16,1998)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/asylum/ref afre.htm> [hereinafter
OAU Convention] (signed, ratified and deposited by Kenya on Sept. 10,1969, June 23,1992
and Feb. 4,1993 respectively).
14. 1951 Convention, supra note 9.
15. Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (visited Apr.
16, 1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/aslum/proteng.htm>
(ratified by Kenya on Nov. 13,1981) [hereinafter OAU Protocol].
[Vol. I
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provisions such as a definition of eligibility for protection 6 and a procedure
for processing refugees.' 7 This framework begins to have a practical effect
upon status determination, when, as a matter of municipal law, the host
country grants asylum.'" As is the case in Dadaab, host countries often
choose not to determine status, however, preferring instead to allow
refugees to stay without establishing their legal personality in municipal
law. UNHCR often adopts its own determination process in order to
establish who merits its assistance, and it runs the camps according to its
own guidelines. These actions are solely a matter of internal UNHCR
organization, and do not engage with municipal law. Therefore, the
refugees have been given what might be called temporary refuge or
temporary protection,"9 determined and implemented by UNHCR, rather
than the host state. Although the presence of the refugees gives rise to
rights and duties vis A vis the host state in international law, the situation
on the ground is being governed in reality largely outside the conventional
application of this legal framework.
f7 This legal muddle illustrates that the current refugee law regime is
ill-equipped to address the challenges raised by the existence of refugees in
development camps. It evidences the necessity of a wholesale
reconceptualization of refugee burden-sharing in international law. In
such a context, when the entire regime within which this operates requires
reform, it would appear inappropriate to examine the exercise of UNHCR
governance in such camps. The majority of the world's refugees live in
development camps, however, and it would be irresponsible to ignore the
legal issues raised by their existence, in lieu of a revolution in refugee law.
UNHCR itself recognizes that
[e]ven in situations where states are resistant to change at the level
of central government, there is often a great deal that can be done
to introduce democratic principles and participatory practices at
the local level. Humanitarian assistance programs, community
development programmes and larger-scale aid projects should
16. See OAU Convention, supra note 13, art. 1; 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art.1.
17. See OAU Convention, supra note 13 art. 2. See generally UNITED NATIONS HIGH
COMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DErERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS (1992), (visited Apr. 16,1998)
<http:/ /www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/handbook/handeng/hbpartl.htm> [hereinafter
UNHCR, HANDBOOK].
18. It is at this point that the host country formally acknowledges that the individual
concerned is a "refugee."
19. See generally Donatella Luca, Questioning Temporary Protection 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 535
(1994) (defining the concept of temporary protection and discussing the issues it raises). "The
'temporary' protection systems of many states could more accurately be called 'indefinite'
protection regimes. Refugee protection frequently amounts to a system of prolonged
'warehousing' in which refugees are denied the right to integrate in the asylum state yet are
unlikely to be restored to meaningful membership in their home community." James
Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal
for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection 10 HARv. HUM. Rrs. J. 115,130-31,158-59.
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always be organized in a manner that promotes what the Global
Governance Commission describes as "neighborhood values":
liberty, justice, equity and mutual respect.21
[8 It is necessary, therefore, to investigate whether and how
international human rights law can have a more meaningful impact,
despite the deficiencies of the current refugee law regime. Is it possible to
acknowledge de jure, through the exercise of human rights law-based
governance, the de facto reality that UNHCR is acting as the sovereign
authority over the refugees? Such "human rights law governance" as I
shall call it presupposes three components: first, the "governed" who are
accorded rights and duties in international human rights law; second, a
"governor" which is bound by international law to observe international
human rights law in the exercise of its governance; and third, the basis for
that "governance," the corpus of international human rights law that
applies to the relationship between the governor and the governed. This
piece will examine each element in turn.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GOVERNANCE
A. The Governed: Refugees
9 The first requirement of human rights governance is that the
individuals governed in the camps are covered by international human
rights law. In particular, does international human rights law apply to
individuals who claim asylum but who have not had their status
determined by the host state, or does their "temporary" status obviate this?
Most of the individuals in such camps meet the criteria for refugee status in
the relevant international instruments.2 Ipso facto, irrespective of status
determination by the host state, such individuals are refugees and entitled
to all the rights concomitant to such status, since determination is
declaratory, not constitutive, of refugee status.2 The host state's
acquiescence and UNHCR's involvement is a tacit acknowledgment of this
principle. However much the concept of "temporary" protection is used
rhetorically to deny that refugees are entitled to any or all refugee law
rights,.2 4 international law requires an unequivocal commitment to them.
21. UNHCR, HUMANTrrARIAN AGENDA, supra note 1, at 273-74.
22. See OAU Convention, supra note 13, art. 1, para.2; 1951 Convention, supra notet, art. 1,
para. A(2).
23. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 17, para. 28; Hathaway, supra note 19, at 158-59.
24. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 167-68 (explaining that states use this term to avoid
according refugees the full rights that they are due).
[Vol. 1
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B. The Governor: UNHCR
1. Evolution from the traditional role
10 The role that UNHCR now occupies demonstrates the cleavage
that exists in refugee protection between traditional international legal
norms and practical realities. Even though UNHCR is exercising de facto
sovereignty, de jure it is merely an invited guest, assisting in the host
state's performance of its obligations25 in a manner wholly governed by the
terms of the invitation.2 From this standpoint, international human rights
law is only applicable to the relationship between refugees and the host
state, not refugees and an international organization like UNHCR. The
host state has minimal inclination or practical capacity to exercise control
over UNHCR's treatment of refugees, and donor states with the potential
to scrutinize this treatment manifest policy objectives somewhat different
from human rights promotion.2 Therefore, such treatment is to all intents
and purposes outside the scope of human rights law.
11 This consequence is part of a more general development in
governance around the world. The twin phenomena of globalization and
fragmentation are leading to a shift of authority over individuals from
states to nongovernmental actors, such as international organizations and
multinational corporations, who are not the traditional subjects of public
international law.2 This shift in turn creates a complex and contradictory
role for such actors. Thus, UNHCR is not monitoring the host state's
treatment of refugees, but adopting the host state's responsibility over
them for itself. In such circumstances, one must examine the status of
UNHCR in international law, to see whether or not an actor so powerfully
involved in the fate of individuals is immune from the very legal
framework with which it is in the business of asking states to comply.
What must be determined is whether UNHCR has personality and
responsibility in public international law, and, if so, whether this
25. "ITihe ultimate responsibility for the refugees within the mandate of the High
Commissioner falls in fact upon the countries of residence ... " G.A. Res. 832, U.N. GAOR,
9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 19, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954). The General Assembly Resolution
further notes that the disproportionate burden falling on certain countries makes
"complementary aid" necessary. Id.
26. Cf. Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A.
Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5- Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 120, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950) (visited Mar. 16,
1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/volrep/hcrsta e.htm> ("The
High Commissioner shall provide for theprotection of refugees falling under the competence
of his [sic] Office by: Promoting through special agreements with Governments the execution
of any measures calculated to improve the situation of refugees and reduce the number
requiring protection.") [hereinafter UNHCR Statute].
27. See James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise ofRefugee Law, 31
HARv. INrr'L L.J. 129,161 (1990) (highlighting the overriding importance to donor states of
issues that affect their own countries).
28. See MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNAnTONAL LAW 137-39 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing states
as the subjects of international law).
1998]
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personality entails being bound by international human rights law.
2. Personality in international law
12 An organization with international legal personality possesses
rights and duties in international law distinct from those it might enjoy in
municipal law. The Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the
United Nations case2 established that the existence of this personality
depends on the raison d'dtre and the modus operandi of the organization in
question, and found that the UN met these requirements. 30 Beyond this
jurisprudence, UNHCR is an agency of the UN set up through a General
Assembly resolution. By stating that UNHCR "shall assume the function of
providing international protection, under the auspices of the United
Nations, to refugees," Article 1 of the Statute3' establishes that the
organization's protection activities form part of the UN's activities."
Furthermore, the nature of the raison d'etre and modus operandi of UNHCR
is consistent with that of the UN insofar as they relate to the question of
personality. That is to say, the purpose and activities of UNHCR are of the
same nature as those purposes and activities of the UN as a whole which
give rise to its personality.
f13 This similarity exists because UNHCR has been mandated by
states to act in a manner both similar and distinct from the way in which
states act. From its inception, the raison d'etre of UNHCR has been to
engage in the kind of activity that states are involved in, "to intervene with
governments on their behalf," as Eleanor Roosevelt remarked in the
debates that preceded the creation of UNHCR. This purpose reaches its
apogee in development camps, where there is no practical difference
between the exercise of authority by UNHCR and that which the host state
would exercise if it were capable. UNHCR is the gatekeeper in deciding
who is entitled to protection, and the government in being entirely
responsible for the running of the camps. In addition to this state-like role,
UNHCR has been mandated by states to act differently from them, yet in
relation to their behavior.9 First, in being authorized by states to monitor
their compliance with international refugee law, UNHCR adopts a role that
29. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, 1949 I.C.J.
174,16 I.L.R. 318 (Apr. 11) (advisory opinion).
30. See id.
31. UNHCR Statute, supra note 26.
32. Schermers states that UNHCR as an "independent organ" of the UN does not have an
independent personality, but does fall within the jurisdiction of the UN. HENRY G. SCHERMERS
& NiELS M. BLOKKER, INrrERNATIONAL INSTIT.TIONAL LAW § 1695 (1995).
33. Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 5th Sess., Agenda Item 32, at 363,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR329 (1950).
34. F. Seyersted considers the existence of a will distinct from that of member states as an
important factor in personality. See SCHERMERS, supra note 32, at 978. Pirkko Kourula states
that UNHCR's functions in paragraph 8 of the Statute are "considered mandatory and not
requiring the consent of the government or the parties concerned, being of a 'supranational'
character." PIRKKo KOURULA, BROADENING THE EDGEs: REFUGEE DEFINrrIoN AND
rNTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 209 (1997).
[Vol. I
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by definition states cannot. Second, in taking over the role of the state in
refugee protection, UNHCR performs a function that only it has the
mandate to monitor. These aspects of UNHCR's mandate suggest that "by
entrusting certain functions" to UNHCR, UN members have "clothed it
with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively
discharged,"3' that is to say becoming part of the personality of the UN. As
such, UNHCR is an international legal person.
14 The possession of international legal personality entails
responsibility in international law. For example, the UN has a certain
degree of liability in international law for its peacekeeping operations.3
The scope of this liability for international organizations depends on two
factors. First, it only applies to those circumstances where the organization
acts in its international legal capacity. Second, it only applies insofar as it is
compatible with the nature of the organization's international legal
personality.
3. The capacity in which it governs
15 International law is only of relevance to UNHCR's governance of
development camps when the organization performs this activity in its
capacity as an international legal personality. International organizations
act in different legal capacities at different times, depending on the
particular circumstances., 7 The nature of the agreements between UNHCR
and the host state that authorize development camps suggest that UNHCR
governs such camps in its international legal capacity. It has already been
stated that this legal capacity arises. out of UNHCR having been authorized
by states to act, in certain circumstances, in a manner akin to a state.-s In
signing an agreement with a host state to run a development camp,
UNHCR is acting in such a manner. It acts as the representative of the
international community, accepting full responsibility for what is in many
cases a regional refugee phenomenon. Rather than performing merely an
assistance role akin to an NGO aid provider, UNHCR is authorized to act
as a state would in arranging for the entry of NGOs into development
camps, and coordinating their activities when there.
35. Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations Case, 1949 I.C.J.
at 179,16 I.L.R. 318.
36. For discussions of this liability, see CHrIrARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF
THE INSITUTIONAL LAW OF LNiTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 242 (1996) and SHAW, supra note
28, at 920 & n.170.
37. It is suggested, for example, that liability in tort over private individuals is in the
exclusive realm of municipal law, see AMERASINGHE, supra note 36, at 226, and that
employment matters are in the sole domain of internal laws, see AMERASNGHE, supra note 36,
at 324; Philippe Cahier, Le Droit Interne des Organizations Internationales, in REvUE GtINRALE DE
DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 563, 585-87, 600-02 (1963).
38. See supra note 34-36 and accompanying text.
1998]
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4. The applicability of international human rights law to its personality
f16 In international law, only the personality of states gives rise to the
full range of rights and duties.3 International organizations with
international legal personality are, in contrast, only subject to international
law to the degree that the nature of their personality dictates.4 It is
therefore necessary to evaluate the mandate of UNHCR to see whether it
suggests that liability in international law can extend as far as adherence to
international human rights law.
17 UNHCR is mandated as the international organization for the
protection of refugees. Scholars often state that the ultimate jurisprudential
basis for international refugee law is international human rights law.4'
What follows from this is that the ultimate mandate for an organization
that takes on responsibilities for refugees is a human rights one.2 Indeed,
the current High Commissioner stated in 1994 that "[flt has become
evident that the promotion of human rights is of vital importance to the
mandate of my Office .... UNHCR today is very much an operational
human rights organization... ."'
[18 On the face of this mandate, it would be inconceivable that
UNHCR, as a creature set up by international law to promote international
human rights law, was not bound by international human rights law itself.
The implications of UNHCR's human rights mandate are complex,
however, and ironically may indeed be at odds with the application of
human rights law to its own work. First, UNHCR's personality in
international law is predicated on it being a non-political, humanitarian
organization. Second, UNHCR's overriding mandate is to promote durable
solutions. Do either of these factors mitigate against a legal personality that
39. See SHAW, supra note 28, at 913.
40. See id. at 913-14.
41. "[H]uman rights should be recognized as central to the entire refugee issue." G.J.L.
COLES, Refugees and Human Rights, 91/1 BULL. HUM. Ris. 63 (1992) [hereinafter COLES,
Refugees]. "It is dear that human rights considerations are central across the spectrum of the
refugee problem, from departure, through refuge to the realization of a lasting solution....
The proper context for approaching refugee issues is their humanitarian and human rights
context." Thorvald Stoltenberg, Statement to the 46" Session of the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, in REFUGEES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 274,275-76 (1990) (emphasis added).
42. The preamble to the 1951 Convention states: "Considering that the Charter of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved on 10 December
1948 by the General Assembly have affirmed the principle that human beings shall enjoy
fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination, Considering that the United
Nations has, on various occasions, manifested its profound concern for refugees and
endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of these fundamental rights and
freedoms .... 1951 Convention, supra note 9, pmbl. Guy Goodwin-GiUl states that from this
"... the potential range of activities [of UNHCR] was as broad as the field of human rights."
Guy Goodwin-Gill, The Language of Protection, 1 IN-r'LJ. REFUGEE L. 6,8 (1989). Eleanor
Roosevelt states that the activities of UNHCR are "in order that... [refugees] might be
afforded minimum rights and privileges essential to their existence and security." Refugees and
Stateless Persons, supra note 33.
43. Sadako Ogata, Statement to the Fiftieth Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in
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entails adherence to human rights law?
19 Despite officially being confined to work of an "entirely non-
political character,"' UNHCR does not operate in a political vacuum.' The
refugee phenomenon impacts national and international spheres; it gives
rise to political, security, and humanitarian concerns; it involves private
and public actors with different objectives and levels of resources.
UNHCR's considerably broad mandate,' as the organization charged to
"assume the function of providing international protection... and of
seeking permanent solutions for the problem of refugees, 4 7 clearly requires
engagement with all of the above issues, necessarily involving decisions of
a political nature. UNHCR has indeed not resiled from doing this,' and its
modus operandi has evolved considerably in the process.49 What has not
developed is a coherent conceptual framework to guide the consequences
of this constantly evolving role.50 For development camp governance,
human rights law provides such a conceptual framework, since it
professionalizes already existing "political" behavior, enabling the
organization to control the political effects of its humanitarian activities
better. Far from being incompatible with UNHCR's mandate, the
application of human rights law is actually a consequence of it.
20 It could be argued that if UNHCR were obliged to respect
international human rights law, this would undermine its responsibility to
realize the long-term durable solutions, such as assimilation, resettlement,
or repatriation, that are the ultimate objectives of its mandate.5'
Compliance with human rights law would encourage the development of
refugee communities within camps. This would risk institutionalizing
exile by further weakening ties with the country of origin and
strengthening links with a host country that is unable to sustain the
permanent habitation of refugees. Since these consequences are
incompatible with its mandate, UNHCR's personality in international law
44. UNHCR Statute, supra note 26, art. 2.
45. "[H]umanitarian action.., often has to be performed in an utterly complex political
context. Apart from the appalling human suffering, the political dimension of refugee issues
is even more prominent...." See Ogata, Peace, supra note 10.
46. The mandate is broad both in terms of its Statute and the notion of "Good Offices." For
further discussion, see P.D. Maynard, The Legal Competence of the United Nations High
Commissionerfor Refugees, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 415,419-21 (1982).
47. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 26, art. 1.
48. See Claire Palley, Legal Issues Arisingfrom Conflicts between UN Humanitarian and
Political Mandates-a Survey, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW Iss.FS 145 (VERA GOWLLAND-DEBBAs ed., 1996) (explaining how
UNHCR has taken on political roles).
49. For discussions of this evolution, see COLES, PROBLEMS supra note 10, at 15; IAN GUEST,
UNHCR AT 40: REFUGEE PROTECTION AT THE CROSSROADS (1991); Michel Moussalli, The
Evolving Functions of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, in PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS OF REFUGEE LAW 81 (Vera Gowland & Claus Samson eds., 1992); Anne Christine
d'Adesky, LNHCR Facing the Refugee Challenge, UN MONTHLY CHRON., Sept. 1991, at 40,43-45.
An example of this evolution is UNHCR's involvement with displaced persons.
50. "Conceptual developments have not kept pace with social and political realities.... A
philosophical basis and set of principles to inform UNHCR's work in this new era must be
developed." Arthur Helton UNHCR and Protection in the 90s, 6 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 1 (1994).
51. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 26, art.8(c), (e).
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cannot countenance it being subject to international human rights law.
[21 Such an interpretation misunderstands the nature of human rights
law and the consequences of its practical application. As has been stated
already, the phenomenon of settled and sophisticated refugee camps is a
reality, regardless of any active promotion by UNHCR or the host state.5
In fact, both parties passively acquiesce in the development of communities
within such camps, by allowing them to exist and by providing basic
facilities. The issue at hand, therefore, is whether UNHCR is obliged to
engage fully with these communities, with human rights law setting the
terms of engagement. Crucially, engagement not only would promote the
development of refugee communities for their own sake, but, also would
ensure that they evolve in such a way that lays the groundwork for a
durable solution. This second consequence suggests that the promotion of
durable solutions, far from invalidating the application of international
human rights law, actually requires it.
922 Refugees who have been able to live in a way that respects their
human dignity, with all of the social, economic, cultural, educational, and
political needs that this entails, are much more likely to thrive in the
community where they end up living.5 For example, some communities in
refugee camps perceive themselves as very much "in exile," and are
desirous of activities in the camps that can prepare them for the role they
will eventually play in their home countries. In Dadaab, these communities
range from former Mogadishu government technocrats to rural community
leaders. For them a human rights framework might effect human rights
education and training, equipping them with the skills necessary for the
social reconstruction they will be engaged in upon their return. The
activities of the Hutu militia in the Goma camps of the former Zaire
illustrate how refugee camps, like any political units, can become breeding
grounds for collective activities of a political nature that end up affecting
other political units and the security of the region. When the effects of such
activities can be so problematic and indeed refugee-generating,- UNHCR's
mandate requires it to engage with the development of refugee camp
communities in a way that focuses them towards activities of a nation-
building, conflict-resolution nature.! It would appear, therefore, that the
application of human rights law is not only compatible with UNHCR's
mandate, but is actually an essential component of the obligation to
52. See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text
53. This is indeed why the Refugee Convention was drafted to accord refugee rights that
would foster self-sufficiency. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 165,168, nn. 176-78,243.
54. See, e.g., Ogata, Peace, supra note 10 (explaining how UNHCR tried to deal with the
situation in the Goma camps).
55. "Vast agglomerations of refugees doomed to an indefinite future of life in bleak and
demoralizing camps can generally become fertile sources of violence born out of frustration
and despair. The extremism bred in such conditions can endanger the peace and security of
entire regions and of the world itself." COLES, PROBLEMS, supra note 41,34; accord Hathaway,
supra note 19,133,175-76; Ben Barber, Feeding Refugees, or War?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July-Aug.
1997, at 8, 8-14.
56. "Humanitarian action, far from being solely a question of international charity, can
support peace and reconciliation." Ogata, Peace, supra note 10.
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promote durable solutions.
I23 In justifying that human rights law is applicable to UNHCR, the
balance has to be right. UNHCR is not a state, and development camps are
not permanent sovereign units that, through the responsible governance of
UNHCR, can constitute a permanent solution to the refugees' plight.7
When a permanent solution is not an immediate possibility, however,
governance by a human rights organization with personality in
international law and an appropriate mandate can and should be
sophisticated enough to ensure that the camp communities develop in an
appropriate fashion. This entails the application of international human
rights law to UNHCR refugee camp governance.
C. The Governance: An International Human Rights Law Framework
1. General principles
f24 In those areas where it has adopted the state's role towards the
refugees, the human rights law that would apply to the host state applies
to UNHCR. This relationship, although legally akin to the relationship
between the refugee and the state, operates differently. In an international
legal order based on the post-Westphalian system of state sovereignty,
non-state actors are in an inferior legal position. Applying human rights
law to them raises challenges inapplicable to state actors. UNHCR is not a
de jure sovereign authority with jurisdiction over small pockets of
international territory. It never has the authority to act without the consent
of the host state, since only the state has the legal personality to allow it
into its territory. As a result, the degree to which international law can
apply to UNHCR governance is inextricably linked to international law's
influence on the sovereign entity. From this relationship, one can explore
the content and enforcement of the applicable law.
25 Although this article previously argues that UNHCR's legal
personality includes the application of human rights law, it does not follow
that the content of this law in any given situation is necessarily as broad as
the entire corpus of international human rights law. Instead, the content is
determined by the particular circumstances of UNHCR's exercise of its
international legal personality. In the case of development camp
governance, it acts by virtue of the personality and jurisdiction of the host
state, taking on some of its international legal responsibilities. It follows
that the human rights law pertaining to these responsibilities is the law that
should apply when UNHCR takes them over. That is to say, UNHCR is
bound by that human rights law to which the state is bound. It is
important to note, however, that the host state may not have incorporated
57. "Although UNHCR can provide refugees with a 'legal homeland,' it has no territory on
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its international human rights law obligations into its domestic law, nor
may it have the will or the wherewithal to promote and protect effectively
such rights as have been incorporated. If UNHCR implements human
rights law in the camps, therefore, a different level of de facto protection
would exist for the refugees and nationals of the host state, even if, as a
matter of international law, an identical body of law applied. Since
UNHCR already governs camps in such a way that refugees within them
enjoy a greater level of development than people in the local area,
however, it has already acknowledged that inequalities will exist between
camps and their localities. This difference is ultimately a matter of
selective enforcement of human rights law, not selective application.
26 The law applicable in any given refugee camp situation would be
drawn from the well-established corpus of international human rights law
which sets out the relationship between the refugee and the state.-" It
would be selected from this corpus according to the legal obligations of the
particular state concerned. In all situations, the relevant provisions of
customary international human rights law apply." These would then be
supplemented by whatever human rights law exists in the treaty
obligations of the host state. ° In the case of Kenya, for example, this
amounts to the rights in the 1951 Convention6 1 defined by the applicable
level of attachment, the more limited rights in the OAU Convention 2 the
duties of the 1951 Conventiono and the OAU Convention, 4 and the rights
and duties of the African Charter.65 UNHCR's own guidelines and EXCOM
Conclusions would be included insofar as the agreement with the host
state that forms the basis for UNHCR's presence allows.
58. For an explanation of this corpus of law, see LAWYERS COm rrrEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
AFRIcAN ExoDUs: REFUGEE CRISIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1969 OAU CONvENnON, 24-27
(1995); RICHARD B. LILucH, HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTrERNATIONAL
LAW (1984); Subrata Roy Chowdhury, A Response to the Refugee Problems in the Post Cold War
Era, 7 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 100, 109; Hathaway, supra note 46, at 157-66; Richard B. Lillich, Duties
of States Regarding the Civil Rights of Aliens, in 161 REcUEiL DES COURS ACAD-MIE DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 329 (1978); Marion Mushkat, Human Rights Under Temporary
Refuge, 3 REVUE DE DROrr INTERNATIONAL 169 (1994); Stephen B. Young, Between Sovereigns: A
Reexamination of the Refugee's Status, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMs OF REFUGEES, 339
(1982); Richard B. Lillich, The Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of
Emergency, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1072-81 (1985) (Current Development)
59. Since "the refugee, like every other category of human being, is ultimately a person
possessing, as such, basic rights which are independent of 'positive' refugee law for their
interpretation." Coles, Refugees, supra note 41, at 63.
60. See UNrFED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (visited Mar. 16,1998)
<http: //www.unhchr.ch/html/intlinst.htm>.
61. See 1951 Convention, supra note t, Articles 3-34.
62. See OAU Convention, supra note 13, art. 1(4)-(6).
63. 1951 Convention, supra note, art. 2.
64. OAU Convention, supra note 13, art. 3.
65. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5,
21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (entered into force October 1986) (visited Mar. 15,1998)
<http:/ /www.unhcr.ch/refworld/legal/instruments/women/afr e.htm>.
66. See ExEcuriVE COMMITEE OF THE HIGH COLMISSIONER'S PROGRAM, CONCLUSIONS
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[27 The liability of UNHCR to comply with this law is more complex.
Regardless of the degree to which the state has handed over its de facto
responsibilities to UNHCR, the state remains liable under international
human rights law. Thus, if human rights law applies to UNHCR, this
liability coexists with that of the host state. Indeed, UNHCR is only able to
govern according to human rights law insofar as the state will allow it,
which can vary from almost total control by UNHCR, to considerable
involvement by the host state. In any given human rights situation, who
would be called to account? A hierarchy of liability could be conceived. At
the top of the hierarchy, the state would be fully and ultimately liable.
Below that, UNHCR would be liable insofar as it is given a prerogative by
the state to determine the human rights situation. The problem with this
approach is that public international law is a horizontal, not a vertical,
system. Alternatively, a concurrent liability model might reconcile the
need to apply the law in a more meaningful manner with the realities of
the international legal system. This model would assume that in those
areas where UNHCR has taken on the state's obligations in international
human rights law, there is prima facie liability concurrent with that of the
state. The side upon which the burden lies in any given case would then
have to be established. When formulating the test to determine this,
specific considerations would have to be borne in mind. They might
include the power balance between the two and possible involvement by
other parties in the situation and their relationship to UNHCR and the
state. It might be possible to deconstruct the elements of. the situation, and
apportion liability to each separately.
28 This enquiry takes international human fights law to new
frontiers. If human rights law is to apply to a multiplicity of actors, how
will their complex interaction in any given situation be addressed, and how
will liability be enforced? Although the application of international human
rights law to the relationship between the individual and the state has
evolved considerably since its relatively recent establishment, it is still in
many ways in its infancy. The expansion of this evolution to cover the
relationship between the individual and the non-state actor is in the realm
of hypothesis. Questions arising from this have yet to be meaningfully
explored in scholarship, let alone reflected in international practice and
institutions. There are no human rights judicial review and enforcement
mechanisms currently in place that are concerned directly with non-state
behavior.
f29 The power relationship in many development camps is relatively
straightforward, however. UNHCR runs the entire operation, with
minimal involvement by the host state. In most situations, it is possible to
identify the locus of power, and therefore establish with a sufficient degree
of certainty the circumstances under which UNHCR has an obligation to
comply with international human rights law. This clarity obviously would
not be the case in emergency status camps, where control is exercised by a
whole host of actors in a competitive and overlapping manner. As far as
enforcement is concerned, human rights governance can to a certain extent
1998]
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be promoted through the (albeit limited) methods of control that currently
exist. Donor states can exercise scrutiny by using the current process
through which they influence UNHCR.67 Host states can incorporate
obligations vis h vis international human rights law into the agreements
they sign with UNHCR. Then, together with NGOs, they can apply the
methodology of international human rights law in their monitoring of
UNHCR development camp governance.
2. How governance would be effected
a. Governance Defined
30 Adopting a human rights law framework would entail UNHCR
governing development camps according to international human rights
law. The full terms of the agreement between the host state and UNHCR
constitute the point of departure. Such an inquiry would reveal the extent
to which UNHCR has taken on the host state's legal responsibilities, and
thus enable the identification of UNHCR activities to which international
human rights law applies. In each of these areas, UNHCR would be
obliged to act in the same manner that a state would, to ensure that the
situation which prevails is one that is in conformity with international
human rights law. This would involve applying the law and substituting
the "state" for UNHCR where appropriate.
f31 This application of human rights law amounts to an evaluation of
UNHCR's behavior, questioning whether or not the rights of refugees are
being respected in those areas in which UNHCR exercises control over
them. Whenever UNHCR limited rights, human rights law would provide
a test against which for such limitations should be justified. Indeed, the
nature of development camps is such that the limitation and derogation
provisions of international human rights law would come into their own.
These provisions allow for the state-and therefore in this case UNHCR-
to take extraordinary measures to safeguard the very existence of the unit
within which human rights can be observed. a This is of particular concern
in development camps, which may be located in areas where the security
situation is insecure and where measures that would normally be
unnecessary in a stable civil society, such as curfews, are essential to
preserve the integrity of the camp. In such circumstances, the balance of
rights and duties between the individual and UNHCR shifts much more
towards UNHCR. Since it is precisely in these situations that human rights
are most at risk, limitation and derogation provisions provide a crucial set
of principles against which extraordinary measures can be tested so as to
ensure that they do not shift the balance towards UNHCR any more than is
67. At meetings of the Executive Committee, for example.
68. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4 & 19 (3), 999




Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, Vol. 1 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol1/iss1/5
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?
necessary. To justify a curfew, for example, UNHCR would have to
determine whether the restriction on the freedom of movement was for a
legitimate purpose (such as to maintain the safety of a camp from attacks
by bandits) and whether it was proportionate to that purpose (i.e. that the
extent of the risk from banditry was such that a curfew was necessary). Of
course, similar considerations form the basis of current management
decisions, since much of human rights law is merely the systematic
articulation of the various tests of necessity and proportionality that any
responsible decision-maker would consider. The application of human
rights law to governance takes these tendencies and puts them on a more
transparent, clearly articulated footing, and one that is by its very nature
capable of adaption to the particular circumstances of governance.
b. Particular circumstances in development camps
31 A full examination of the practical application of international
human rights law in development camps is beyond the scope of this piece,
since it covers the same law as that which applies between refugees and
states. There are, however, certain characteristics particular to development
camp governance that would affect this application. These include:
UNHCR's approach to its role, the fragile nature of refugee camps, the
devolved nature of power, the importance of preserving cultural
communities, and the problem of disenfranchised refugee women.
i. LNHCR's Self Image
32 The adoption of a human rights framework would require a leap
of faith on the part of UNHCR. The organization would have to think in
legal terms like a state responsible for human rights rather than a private
actor responsible for refugee rights. Instead of viewing itself as the
provider of certain basic services in the camps, it would confront the reality
of governing a political unit, and therefore adopt a coherent and co-
ordinated holistic strategy to run through all aspects of camp life.. This
would require a shift of emphasis away from what James Hathaway sees as
the "remedial or palliative" function of the traditional refugee law activities
that prevail in emergency situations, like the prevention of non refoulement.
6 Instead, UNHCR would have to act in tune with the "interventionist or
facilitative"' 7 nature of international human rights law. Governance in
development camps does not concern refugees solely qua refugees, but qua
human beings, who are entitled to the greatest range of human rights
promotion that is possible. A step towards this is evident in the guidelines
that UNHCR has already adopted on discrete areas of governance, such as
women,' children,' and sexual violence73 Development camps require
69. James Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection, 4 J. REFUGEE
STUD. 113,177 (1991).
70. Id.
71. See Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women, EC/SCP/67 (1991); EXCOM
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governance that is as multifaceted as the term would suggest, however,
involving as broad a range of considerations as any political unit.
ii. Insecurity
[33 UNHCR's approach to the application of international human
rights law should be flexible enough to take account of possible changes in
the very raison d'Otre of a camp. By its nature, a refugee camp situation is
unstable. It can shift from an emergency situation to a development one
and back again, as the aforementioned situation in the Goma Camps in
Zaire demonstrated. 4 These shifts can be precipitated by a wide range of
political, economic, environmental and security factors; they can be
derived from events in the host state, the country of origin, or the camp
itself. This insecurity precipitates a very different approach to governance
than that which prevails in a more stable political unit like a state during
peacetime. UNHCR has had to build up expertise in finessing its behavior
to the particularities of any given refugee situation to the extent that it
categorizes the status of camps (such as "emergency" or "development"), to
govern in a manner appropriate to that status, and is able to manage a
situation in which the categories blend into each other. The application of
international human rights law in development camps has to be similarly
finessed. The closest legal analogy to the application of international
human rights law in a state context would be a state of emergency. In such
circumstances, the aforementioned derogation and limitation tests of
international human rights law are applied when certain aspects of civil
society are restricted more than usual during an extraordinary situation
prevailing in a state.5  In development camps, human rights law
governance will have to draw on this jurisprudence, and marry it with
UNHCR's experience of constantly fluctuating camp status into an
approach which can reconcile the need to promote the rights of the
refugees in the camps with the constant insecurity of the camp itself. This
requires the application of international human rights law to concerns that
do not normally prevail on a state level. This is an enterprise which
UNHCR is well-placed to engage in, however, since for the organization it
amounts to the application of a new set of questions to an existing tradition
conclusions, supra note 66, No. 39 (XXXVI) (1985) "Refugee Women and International
Protection," 54 (XXXIX) "Refugee Women," 60 (XL) (1989) "Refugee Women," 64 (XLI)
"Refugee Women and International Protection," and 73 (XLIV) (1993) "Refugee Protection and
Sexual Violence," (visited Mar. 15,1998) <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr from there
select "UNHCR Official Documents," "Executive Committee Documents," and lastly,
"Executive Committee Council">.
72. See EXCOM conclusions, supra note 66, No. 47 (XXXVIII) (1987) "Refugee Children,"
and 59 (XL) (1989) "Refugee Children," (visited Mar. 15,1998)
<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/unhcr,, from there select "UNHCR Official Documents,"
"Executive Committee Documents," and lastly, "Executive Committee Council">.
73. See UNHCR, SEXUAL VIOLENcE AGAINST REFUGEES, GUIDELINES ON PREVENTION AND
RESPONSE (1995).
74. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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of governance.
iii. Devolved power
34 Human rights law has to be able to speak to the devolved nature of
power in development camp governance. In so doing, its role should be
similar to, and different from, that of a bill of rights in a national
constitution. It should promote a culture of rights and duties in the camps,
therefore meeting the constitutional needs of a sophisticated polity. This
promotion, however, should take a particular form. For practical reasons,
it could not entail a body of law that is justiciable in a litigative sense, but
rather a set of principles that would be the cornerstone of all decisions
made by those responsible for governance in the camps. Implementing
Partners currently exercise their considerable 76 responsibilities with a high
degree of autonomy. A global human rights strategy, coordinated by
UNHCR among all these agencies, would require IPs to examine how their
activities impacted on the human rights of refugees and what
improvements could be made. 7 Human rights law would no longer be the
exclusive concern of protection officers. It would be of relevance to all who
exercise authority in camp governance. Its adoption should both
professionalize the human rights activities and reporting' that protection
officersP engage in, and increase possibilities for partnership with other
actors such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR),s by clearly establishing a legal framework for such activities.
iv. Preserving Communities
[35 The importance of individual communities in development camps
requires a particular emphasis on those areas of human rights law which
aim to preserve cultural identities.81 Refugee camps contain not only
groups of individuals who have been bundled together in a particular area,
but also series of communities that operate on different levels and in
different ways, evolving over the passage of time. For the refugees in
Dadaab who have seen the breakdown of their societies and, in the case of
the Somalis, their entire country, the traditional rituals of community and
family life are all they have left to maintain a sense of identity. The
importance of engaging in such practices has already been acknowledged
in the religious sphere, through the sophisticated array of religious
activities in the camps from the mosques and Sha'ria education for Islamist
76. MSF-B is solely responsible for all of the medical care in the camps. CARE controls
one of the key activities of camp governance, food distribution.
77. See UNHCR Statute, supra note 26, art. 8(i) (UNHCR's mandate includes "co-ordination
of the efforts of private organizations concerned with the welfare of refugees.").
78. See AFRICAN EXODUS, supra note 58, at 170 (describing current problems in human
rights monitoring in development camps).
79. "Protection officer" is a term that refers to UNHCR legal personnel.
80. See Helton, supra note 50, at 2-3 (advocating such co-operation).
81. See Hathaway, supra note 19, at 173-6 (discussing the importance of this emphasis).
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Somalis to the churches and festivals of the Ethiopian Christians. Human
rights law governance extends this from an ad hoc concern with particular
cultural practices, to an integrated system that engages with the entirety of
religious, cultural and social life in the camps. An example of this would
be in education. Article 22 of the 1951 Convention sets out a standard of
protection for "Public Education," which applies inter alia to "access to
studies."' Article 3 contains an obligation to apply the provisions of the
Convention "without discrimination as to race, religion or country of
origin.' ' 3 The combined effect of these two articles on camp governance is
that UNHCR is obliged to ensure that its educational programs operate in
such a way that they allow all the communities in the camps to participate.
v. Disenfranchised Women
[36 Human rights law should be applied in such a way that
governance does not perpetuate the disenfranchisement of those groups,
notably women ' and children, that have been identified by UNHCR as
particularly vulnerable in refugee camps. It is axiomatic that the
disempowered in society often suffer most acutely when that society
breaks down. A camp is by definition a refuge from such suffering, but
one constituted by its own particularly fragile form of society, in which
authority over individuals is exercised on many different levels. In such
circumstances, what might be described as a "chain of protection" exists,
that is to say, a complex system of relationships, each entailing rights and
duties, which determines the level of protection accorded to any given
individual within the chain. Such relationships operate at the individual,
family, community, IP, UNHCR, and host state level. If the considerations
that flow from the application of human rights law do not impact on all in
the chain, any activities by UNHCR are undermined by weak links.6
37 One example of this problem is in refugee decision-making fora.
Typically, UNHCR consults with such bodies on many important decisions
in the camps. It does not necessarily engage in a rigorous examination of
their representative nature, however, but instead takes their authority at
face value. In Dadaab, this meant that consultation amounted to nothing
more than a veneer of popular participation, since the forum chosen was
dominated by men, thus disenfranchising the women in the camps.7
82. 1951 Convention, supra note 9, art. 22.
83. 1951 Convention, supra note t, art. 3.
84. See DEVELOPMENrf AND DIASPORA: GENDER AND THE REFUGEE EXPERIENCE (Wenona
Giles et al. eds., 1996); SUSAN FORBES MARTIN, REFUGEE WO.ME 16-23 (describing the issues
faced by refugee women).
85. See Neil Boothby, Displaced Children: Psychological Theory and Practice from the Field, 5 J.
REFUGEE STUD. 106 (1992); NEIL BOOTHBY Er AL., UNAccOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND
PROTECTION IN WARS, NATURAL DIsAsrERs AND REFUGEE MOVEIMENE (1988) (discussing the
issues faced by refugee children).
86. "[Human rights] can be improved if the possibility is found and everybody takes his
or her role to play within the situation, either agencies or community members." Dadaab
Questionnaire Responses, supra note 2.
87. See Wilde, supra note 2, at 10-11.
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Furthermore, this undermined the value of decisions taken, since most
decisions actually concerned activities that were the exclusive concern of
women, such as water supplies.? Adherence to the various measures of
the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against
Women could reduce the risk of such problems occurring. Article 2
requires that UNHCR "ensure that public authorities and institutions shall
act in conformity with this obligation" (not to discriminate) and "take all
appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any
person, organization or enterprise."' O As regards decision-making in
particular, Article 7 obliges UNHCR to
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in the political and public life of the country [sic] and, in
particular, shall ensure to women, on equal terms with men, the
right:
To vote in all elections and public referenda and to be eligible for
selection to all publicly elected bodies;
To participate in the formulation of government policy and the
implementation thereof and to hold public office and perform all
public functions at all levels of government;
To participate in non-governmental organizations and associations
concerned with the public and political life of the country.9
H38 Obviously, these provisions are phrased literally in terms of the
institutions of state, rather than camp, governance. In applying them to
camp governance, it is necessary to transpose their spirit to a camp
setting.92 For example, one of the relevant camp processes to which the
88. One particular decision concerned the location of water taps, used by women to collect
water to meet all of their family's needs. A failure to consult women, therefore, not only
deprived them of the right to participate, but involved an issue where their input would be
vital and the outcome would affect both the family in general and women in particular (who
would have additional burdens if the taps were located inappropriately).
89. 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) (ratified by Kenya on Mar. 9,1984) (visited July 15, 1998)
http://www.tufts.edu/departments/fletcher/multi/texts/BH769.txt.
90. Id. at art. 2.
91. Id. at art 7.
92. Indeed, the use of "in particular," id., implies that even in the state context, the list of
processes in Article 7 is not meant to be exhaustive. Instead, it should be seen as a series of
important suggestions, which can be supplemented according to the circumstances.
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provisions could apply would be participation in the selection for, and
membership in, a decision-making forum. In this case, UNHCR would be
obliged to critically appraise the full context within which the forum
operates to see whether women were able, on equal terms with men, to be
candidates, to vote, and to campaign in elections. This example illustrates
that-human rights law governance entails an ever-vigilant appraisal of all
the camp processes over which UNHCR has authority, not just those it
directly controls.
IV. CONCLUSION
39 It is possible to apply the current norms of public international law
in a new but authentic manner that allows the principles of human rights
to have a juridical impact upon UNHCR development camp governance.
The refugees who are governed in such camps are subjects of international
human rights law. UNHCR governs such camps in its capacity as an
international legal person, and the nature of this personality is compatible
with the application of human rights law to it. What is currently missing is
the logical consequence of the relationship between the two, namely the
exercise of governance that is rooted in international human rights law. To
give effect to this consequence through the adoption of a human rights law
framework is to attempt to mitigate some of the unfortunate aspects of the
current legal regime from within the parameters of that regime. It is not an
ultimate solution to the current crisis in refugee protection. What is
fundamentally required is the wholesale revision of the operation of
international refugee law, so that it can have a more effective impact on the
rights and duties of refugees, states, and organizations. Until a regime is
developed that speaks to the nature of the current refugee phenomenon,
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